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 OPINION 
                      
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Plaintiffs appeal from the April 16, 1996, judgment of the 
district court granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended 
complaint pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).  See Williams v. 
Stone, 923 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1996).  We will affirm the 
judgment of the district court, although on different grounds 
than those relied upon by the district court. 
 I. 
 West Coast Video Enterprises, Inc. (“WCVE”) is a 
Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in 
Pennsylvania.  WCVE sells franchises for retail video rental 
businesses operating under the name “West Coast Video.”  WCVE 
supplies its franchisees with equipment, computers, software, 
video films, expertise, and training in the operation of retail 
video rental businesses.  By September of 1986, WCVE had at least 
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221 franchises in fourteen states, including eleven in Maryland. 
 Defendants are executives, employees, and agents of WCVE 
(collectively “WCV”). 
 In June of 1985, plaintiffs Michael and Marilyn Williams, 
residents of Pennsylvania, visited a WCVE store located in 
Philadelphia for the purpose of investigating the purchase of a 
WCVE franchise.  By November of 1988, defendant John Barry, Vice 
President of Franchise Development for WCVE, had written the 
Williamses twice and phoned them six times concerning their 
prospective purchase of a franchise. 
 In March of 1989, the Williamses visited WCVE corporate 
headquarters in Philadelphia to further investigate the purchase 
of a WCVE franchise.  At that time executives of WCVE made a 
number of representations alleged to have been fraudulent.  On 
March 29, 1989, the Williamses, acting through their wholly-owned 
corporation, Helened, Inc., purchased a WCVE franchise located in 
Ocean City, Maryland pursuant to a written franchise agreement 
(“the Franchise Agreement”).  The Franchise Agreement was 
executed in Pennsylvania.  Article IX, paragraph 2 of the 
Franchise Agreement provides:  “[N]either this Agreement nor any 
of its rights or privileges . . . shall be assigned, transferred, 
mortgaged, charged, encumbered or divided in any manner by the 
Franchisee or anyone else unless the prior written approval of 
the Franchisor is obtained.”  App. at 209.  Article IX, paragraph 
2E of the Franchise Agreement provides that such approval may be 
conditioned on 
[t]he Execution by the Franchisee of a 
release of any and all claims against 
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Franchisor, and the Franchisor’s officers, 
directors, agents and employees, arising out 
of or related to this Agreement, which 
release shall contain such language and be of 
the form chosen by Franchisor.  The release 
shall not release any liability specifically 
provided for by any state statute regulating 
franchising. 
 
Id. at 210.  Article XIII of the Franchise Agreement provides, in 
part:  “This Agreement shall be construed according to the laws 
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . .”  Id. at 214. 
 The Williamses opened the store in September of 1989.  They 
claim that WCVE failed in several respects to abide by its 
obligations as set forth in the Franchise Agreement, and they 
sold the store to a third party some 27 months later.  As a 
condition of WCVE’s consent to this sale, the Williamses signed a 
release of any and all claims against WCVE and its officers, 
directors, agents, and employees (“the Release”).  The Release 
was executed in Ocean City, Maryland.  At the time the Release 
was signed, more than seven years remained on the Franchise 
Agreement. 
 The Williamses brought this action in the district court on 
January 2, 1996.  In an amended complaint containing ten causes 
of action, the Williamses alleged that defendants operated WCVE 
as an “enterprise” in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1984).  
In support of their RICO claims, they alleged that WCV engaged in 
the following “racketeering activity,” within the meaning of 18 
U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. 1997):  (1) criminal violations of the 
Maryland Franchise Registration and Disclosure Act (“MFRDA”), MD. 
  
 
 5 
CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 14-201 et. seq. (1992);1 (2) violations of 
Federal Trade Commission regulations promulgated at 16 C.F.R. § 
436.1 et seq., pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. 1996); (3) 
violations of the Aid to Small Businesses Act, 15 U.S.C. § 645(a) 
(1976); and (4) bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 
(Supp. 1996).  The Williamses further alleged that WCV conspired 
to engage in the above-described racketeering activity in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Supp. 1996). 
 On April 16, 1996, the district court granted WCV’s motion 
to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds that the Release 
bars any action by the Williamses against WCV.  See Williams, 923 
F. Supp. at 693.2  This appeal followed. 
 II. 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this 
federal RICO action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993).  
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1993), we exercise appellate 
jurisdiction over the district court’s final order dismissing the 
                     
     
1We note that the current version of the Maryland Franchise 
Registration and Disclosure Act (“MFRDA”) went into effect in 
1992, after the operative facts relevant to this action occurred. 
 Because the parties have not alerted us to any relevant 
distinctions between this version and the former version of the 
MFRDA, we cite to the current version, as do the parties. 
     
2WCV raised two additional arguments in its motion to dismiss 
the amended complaint: (1) that the Williamses’ RICO claims are 
barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) that the Williamses 
have failed adequately to plead a pattern of racketeering activity 
pursuant to RICO.  See Williams v. Stone, 923 F. Supp. 689, 691 
(E.D. Pa. 1996).  The district court relied solely on WCV’s 
Release argument in dismissing the amended complaint and did not 
address these two additional issues.  See id. at 693 & n.3.  
Accordingly, and in light of our disposition of this matter, we do 
not address the additional defenses. 
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amended complaint. 
 A. 
 The parties agree that, even though this matter is premised 
on federal causes of action, state law governs the applicability 
of a release to those causes of action.  See Three Rivers Motors 
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 892 n.15 (3d Cir. 1975).  
The parties disagree over which state law applies -- Pennsylvania 
or Maryland.  WCV claims that Pennsylvania law applies, given the 
choice-of-law provision in the Franchise Agreement, while the 
Williamses claim Maryland law applies.3  
 Before engaging in an extensive and complex analysis of the 
thorny choice-of-law questions this case presents, we must first 
determine whether there exists a true conflict between the 
application of Pennsylvania and Maryland law.  Under general 
conflict of laws principles, where the laws of the two 
jurisdictions would produce the same result on the particular 
issue presented, there is a “false conflict,” and the Court 
should avoid the choice-of-law question.  See Lucker Mfg. v. Home 
Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 813 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Pennsylvania 
choice-of-law rules); Coons v. Lawlor, 804 F.2d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 
1986) (same); In re Complaint of Bankers Trust Co., 752 F.2d 874, 
                     
     
3WCV states that “Plaintiffs have abandoned . . . on appeal” 
the argument that “the parties failed to make an effective choice 
of Pennsylvania law as the law applicable to their franchise 
relationship,” and now argue “for the first time that a thorough 
choice of law analysis was necessary to determine the state law 
applicable to the Release.”  Appellees’ Br. at 2; see also id. at 
8.  The distinction WCV attempts to draw is without substance.  We 
have not been alerted to any difference between the Williamses’ 
position here and the position they took in the district court. 
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882 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); Rohm and Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 
689 F.2d 424, 429 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying New Jersey choice-of-
law rules). 
 As the Williamses essentially concede, if Pennsylvania law 
applies, the Release is valid and bars their action.4  However, 
the parties disagree over whether the Release is valid pursuant 
to Maryland law as well.  Thus, in order to determine whether a 
true conflict is presented, we must decide which party proffers 
the correct interpretation of Maryland law. 
B. 
 Section 14-226 of the Maryland Code Annotated, Business 
Regulations provides:  “As a condition of the sale of a 
franchise, a franchisor may not require a prospective franchisee 
to agree to a release, assignment, novation, waiver, or estoppel 
that would relieve a person from liability under this subtitle” 
(emphasis added).  The Williamses contend that this provision 
                     
     
4The Williamses also contend that the Release is invalid as 
unsupported by consideration.  Under both Maryland law, see 
Vogelhut v. Kandel, 517 A.2d 1092, 1096 (Md. 1986), and 
Pennsylvania law, see Channel Home Ctrs. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 
291, 299 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying Pennsylvania law); Stelmack v. 
Glen Alden Coal Co., 14 A.2d 127, 128 (Pa. 1940); PNC Bank, N.A. 
v. Balsamo, 634 A.2d 645, 655 (Pa. Super. 1993), consideration for 
a promise consists of either some benefit to the promisor or some 
detriment to the promisee.  In a nearly identical fact pattern, 
using an identical definition of consideration pursuant to 
Virginia law, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has 
written that the benefit consisting of a franchisee’s “ability to 
get out of a business which he had determined was not profitable . 
. . constitutes sufficient consideration to support [a] 
release[].”  Brock v. Entre Computer Ctrs., Inc., 933 F.2d 1253, 
1261 (4th Cir. 1991).  We agree. 
 Counsel for the Williamses additionally contended at oral 
argument, for the first time, that the Release was unconscionable. 
 In light of the delay in raising this issue, we decline to 
address  this contention. 
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renders the Release invalid if Maryland law applies. 
 WCV argues that because section 14-226 protects only 
“prospective” franchisees, and because the Release was signed 
when the Williamses were already franchisees, the Williamses may 
not rely on section 14-226 to avoid the Release, even assuming 
arguendo that Maryland law applies.  The district court agreed 
with this reasoning and relied on it, in part, in dismissing the 
amended complaint.  See Williams, 923 F. Supp. at 692-93.  WCV 
also argues that, assuming Maryland law applies, section 14-226 
invalidates the Release only as to causes of action grounded in 
the MFRDA, and that the Release still bars the Williamses from 
bringing this federal RICO action.  Because we agree with this 
second contention, we do not address whether the district court 
correctly held that section 14-226 is inapplicable to this matter 
on the ground that the Williamses were not “prospective 
franchisee[s]” when they executed the Release. 
 1. 
 The plain language of section 14-226 supports WCV’s 
contention that that provision invalidates the Release only 
insofar as the Release purports to waive a cause of action 
pursuant to the MFRDA.  Maryland could have, but chose not to, 
forbid a franchisor from requiring a franchisee to agree to a 
release or waiver “that would relieve a person from liability.”  
Cf. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/41 (West 1996) (“Any condition . . 
. purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive 
compliance with any provision of this Act or any other law of 
this State is void.”) (emphasis added); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-5-
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12 (Michie 1996) (“Any condition . . . in any agreement evidenced 
by a franchise agreement . . . purporting to waive compliance 
with any provision of this chapter, or other provision of state 
law applying to such agreements[,] is void as a matter of public 
policy.”) (emphasis added); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-21.11(10) (Michie 
1996) (“Any provision in any agreement or franchise purporting to 
waive any right or remedy under this chapter or any applicable 
provisions of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 
2802 et. seq.) shall be null and void.”) (emphasis added).  By 
adding the words “under this subtitle,” the Maryland legislature 
substantially limited the reach of the anti-waiver provision.  We 
must examine the Williamses’ claims to determine whether they are 
premised on WCV’s alleged “liability under” the MFRDA. 
 2. 
 The Williamses have brought this action pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d).  Section 1962(c) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person employed 
by or associated with any enterprise engaged 
in, or the activities of which affect, 
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or 
participate, directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through 
a pattern of racketeering activity or 
collection of unlawful debt. 
 
“Racketeering activity” is defined as, inter alia, conduct 
involving any one of nine enumerated offenses that “is chargeable 
under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one 
year.”  18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A).  Section 1962(d) forbids 
conspiring to violate, inter alia, section 1962(c). 
 The Williamses have alleged that WCV engaged in 
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“racketeering activity” by violating certain criminal provisions 
of the MFRDA.  Thus, the Williamses argue, WCV’s liability arises 
under the MFRDA, even as this liability provides the predicate 
act under RICO.  According to the Williamses, the anti-waiver 
provision forbidding a release “from liability under this 
subtitle” prohibits WCV from extracting not only a release of 
claims brought directly pursuant to the MFRDA, but also a release 
of RICO claims predicated on allegations of criminal violations 
of the Maryland statute. 
 This contention is at odds with our decision in United 
States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135 (3d Cir. 1977).  In that 
case, criminal indictments were brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
1962(c) and (d), charging defendants with “racketeering 
activities” consisting of “`acts of bribery . . . in violation of 
the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.’”  Id. at 1131-32 
n.2 (quoting indictment) (alteration in original).  The district 
court dismissed some of the indictments based on the fact that 
the two-year limitations period for bribery under Pennsylvania 
law had expired.  See id. at 1134 & n.9. 
 We reversed, holding that “the applicable period of 
limitations is governed by federal, rather than state, law.”  Id. 
at 1134.  We reasoned: 
RICO is a federal law proscribing various 
racketeering acts which have an effect on 
interstate or foreign commerce.  Certain of 
those racketeering, or predicate[,] acts 
violate state law and RICO incorporates the 
elements of those state offenses for 
definitional purposes.  State law offenses 
are not the gravamen of RICO offenses.  RICO 
was not designed to punish state law 
violations; it was designed to punish the 
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impact on commerce caused by conduct which 
meets the statute’s definition of 
racketeering activity.  To interpret state 
law offenses to have more than a definitional 
purpose would be contrary to the legislative 
intent of Congress and existing state law. 
 
Id. at 1135 (footnote omitted); see also United States v. 
Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1131 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he state 
offenses enumerated in section 1961(1) are merely 
definitional.”); United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1066-67 
(3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1087 
(3d Cir. 1977) (“`[R]eference to state law [in section 
1961(1)(A)] is necessary only to identify the type of unlawful 
activity in which the defendant intended to engage.’”) (quoting 
United States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274, 286 (7th Cir. 1971)) 
(alterations added).  We have applied the teachings of Forsythe 
and its progeny in the civil RICO context.  See, e.g., Rose v. 
Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 361-62 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 While this case raises a different legal issue, the 
reasoning utilized in Forsythe applies here with full force.  
RICO is a federal statute.  It arguably incorporates elements of 
certain offenses under the MFRDA as “racketeering activity,” or 
“predicate acts.”  However, state law in this case simply 
provides the meaning of “racketeering activity” pursuant to 
section 1961(1)(A).  Thus, the state law offenses the Williamses 
claim were committed by WCV serve no more than a “definitional 
purpose” vis-à-vis an allegation of a RICO violation -- they 
merely define the types of activity that may constitute predicate 
acts pursuant to the federal RICO statute.   The gravamen of 
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their RICO cause of action is not the violation of state law, but 
rather certain conduct, illegal under state law, which, when 
combined with an impact on commerce, constitutes a violation of 
federal law.  Therefore, it is not alleged that WCV is subject to 
“liability under” the MFRDA; their liability to the Williamses, 
if any, stems from RICO.  Assuming arguendo that Maryland law 
applies, because section 14-226 invalidates the Release only 
insofar as it relieves WCV of “liability under” the MFRDA, the 
Release is valid to the extent it relieves WCV of liability under 
any other statute, including RICO. 
 3. 
 The Williamses urge that, even if section 14-226 applies 
only to those waivers of liability under the MFRDA, the Release 
would be void ab initio pursuant to Maryland law because the 
Release purports to waive all of WCV’s liability and because it 
does not contain a severability clause.  We reject this argument. 
 The Franchise Agreement provides that any release executed by 
the Williamses in exchange for consent to assign the franchise 
“shall not release any liability specifically provided for by any 
state statute regulating franchising.”  App. at 210.  
Furthermore, the Franchise Agreement contains a severability 
clause.  While the Release itself contains no such exceptions and 
no severability clause, the Release is inextricably intertwined 
with the Franchise Agreement, because the execution by the 
Williamses of the Release was required by the Franchise 
Agreement.  Cf. Brock v. Entre Computer Ctrs., Inc., 933 F.2d 
1253, 1259 (4th Cir. 1991).  Read together, again assuming that 
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Maryland law applies, the two documents carve out and preserve 
WCV’s liability under the MFRDA. 
 Moreover, even absent those provisions in the Franchise 
Agreement, section 14-226, if it is applicable in this matter, is 
implicitly incorporated into the Release, rendering unenforceable 
that portion that purports to waive WCV’s liability pursuant to 
the MFRDA.  It is 
indelibly clear that Maryland adheres to the 
general rule that parties to a contract are 
presumed to contract mindful of the existing 
law and that all applicable or relevant laws 
must be read into the agreement of the 
parties just as if expressly provided by 
them, except where a contrary intention is 
evident. 
 
Wright v. Commercial and Sav. Bank, 464 A.2d 1080, 1083 (Md. 
1983) (citing cases); see also Post v. Bregman, 686 A.2d 665, 673 
(Md. App. 1996); Heyda v. Heyda, 615 A.2d 1218, 1222 (Md. App. 
1992).  Accordingly, no severability clause was necessary in the 
Release and section 14-226 would not render the Release void ab 
initio pursuant to Maryland law. 
 C. 
 We conclude that, pursuant to Maryland law, the Release 
would bar this action.  The parties agree that this action would 
be barred by the Release pursuant to Pennsylvania law as well.  
Accordingly, no true conflict is presented and the Court need not 
address the choice-of-law issues. 
 III. 
 Pursuant to the law of either Pennsylvania or Maryland, the 
Release is valid, at least insofar as it waives WCV’s liability 
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pursuant to RICO.  Accordingly, the Williamses are barred from 
bringing this RICO action regardless of which state’s law 
applies.  The April 16, 1996, judgment of the district court will 
be affirmed. 
 Each party to bear its own costs. 
 
